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339 
Effects of Japanese Financial Regulations and Keiretsu 






The purpose of this paper is to highlight the differences between the 
United States (“U.S.”) and Japan’s corporate governance system.  A majority 
of this report’s analysis will focus on financial regulations and Japan’s 
Keiretsu system—a system of corporate entities with formal and informal 
relationships, held together through multiple cross-holdings of each other, 
often centered around a financial entity.1   
Different ideals heavily influence each economy differently.  A rigid 
system of corporate formality bolsters the U.S. system, crusading against 
conflicts of interest, holding a belief in strong antitrust laws.  The Japanese 
system, on the other hand, is one dependent on relationship interests to 
provide support for one another.   
The U.S. and Japan’s respective laws and actions reflect the difference 
between the two systems. However, as Japan adapts to new global realities, 
it continues to place itself in the awkward position of clinging onto old 
systems while simultaneously trying to instill modern reforms. 
  
 
 1. Randall Morck, Masao Nakamura & Avil Shivdasani, Banks, Ownership Structure, 
and Firm Value in Japan, 73 J. BUS. 539, 542 (2000). 
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II. Legal Realities Between the Two Systems 
A. Underlying U.S. Financial Regulation and Laws 
 
Antitrust laws in general, and the Sherman Act in particular, 
are the Magna Carta of free enterprise. They are as important to 
the preservation of economic freedom and our free-enterprise 
system as the Bill of Rights is to the protection of our fundamental 
personal freedoms. And the freedom guaranteed each and every 
business, no matter how small, is the freedom to compete—to 
assert with vigor, imagination, devotion, and ingenuity whatever 
economic muscle it can muster. 
                                   -Supreme Court Justice Thurgood Marshall.2 
 
The U.S. economy is built on an economic system of free enterprise that 
opposes conflicts of interest.  There are few areas of the U.S. economy where 
this is more prevalent than in the financial industry.  Despite the many 
critiques against the industry, one cannot deny that finance remains one of 
the most regulated industries in the U.S.  
During the presidency of Franklin D. Roosevelt, as a part of the New 
Deal Era, Congress passed the U.S.A Banking Act of 1933, commonly 
known as Glass-Steagall.3  This legislation was in response to three 
successive, debilitating financial crises starting in the late nineteenth 
century—the Great Depression in the 1930s being especially traumatic.   
Glass-Steagall’s explicit intent was “[t]o provide for the safer and more 
effective use of the assets of banks, to regulate interbank control, to prevent 
the undue diversion of funds into speculative operations, and for other 
purposes.”4  In doing so, Glass-Steagall separated investment banking from 
commercial banking, prevented commercial banks from investing in stock 
or equity, and created the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, more 
commonly known as FDIC.   
Nearly 70 years later, in 1999 during a period of financial deregulation, 
Congress passed the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (also known as the Financial 
Services Modernization Act of 1999), which repealed parts of Glass-Steagall 
but still kept several vital provisions.  Today, financial holding companies 
are allowed to hold both investment and commercial banks (indirectly 
 
 2. United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 610, (1972).  See also Mitsubishi 
Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 651 (1985). 
 3. The Banking Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-89, 48 Stat. 162. 
 4. Id.  
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marrying the two types of banks together again).5  Nevertheless, the statute 
stating a “bank holding company or a subsidiary may not engage in, or 
acquire or control, directly or indirectly, voting securities or assets of a 
company,” remains intact as a core value of today’s financial sector.6  Under 
specific circumstances—often in connection with bankruptcy—U.S. banks 
are occasionally allowed to hold securities but only temporarily.7  In all, 
despite financial deregulation, the U.S. government still believes the interest 
of banks must be separated from the activities of other companies.   
 
B. Underlying Japanese Financial Regulations 
1. Formal Legal Standards 
 
In direct conflict with the U.S. system, Japan allows commercial banks 
to own equity in other firms.8  This system has roots in the Zaibatsu 
organizations from the Meiji Era.  Zaibatsu organizations were created by 
influential families who operated large banks as control centers to manage 
the family’s closely held corporations.9  Zaibatsu banks then took the form 
of holding companies, similar to the Chaebol organizations seen in South 
Korea today—which include conglomerates such as Samsung, Hyundai, HK, 
and LG.10  Today, Japan’s Zaibatsu legacy lives on through the financial 
environment as Keiretsu style groups.  Different from the Zaibatsu, Keiretsu 
corporate groups are made up of companies related through a complex web 
of intercorporate ownership centered around banks, but often lacking a 
central holding company as seen in the Zaibatsu.11   
Unlike the U.S., which has prohibited banks from holding equity stakes 
in other firms, Japanese laws allowed banks to own up to 10% of a firm’s 
outstanding shares until 1977.12  In 1977, Japan passed the Japanese Anti-
Monopoly Act, which lowered the equity ownership of banks to 5% of 
another firm’s stock, but many corporate traditions and trends remained 
 
 5. Gramm–Leach–Bliley Financial Modernization Act, Pub. L. No. 106–102, § 113, 5 
Stat. 1338 (1999). 
 6. 12 C.F.R. § 225.21 (1984). 
 7. Morck supra note 1. 
 8. Morck supra note 1. 
 9. Zaibatsu, ENCYC. BRITANNICA (Sept. 27, 2019), https://www.britannica.com/topic/ 
zaibatsu.  
 10. Peter Pae, South Korea’s Chaebol, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 29, 2019), https://www.bloom 
berg.com/quicktake/republic-samsung. 
 11. Keigo Tajima, Keiretsu, ENCYC. BRITANNICA (Sept. 9, 2019), https://www.britan 
nica.com/topic/keiretsu.   
 12. Morck supra note 1. 
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unchanged (additionally, there still exist exceptions that allow some 
institutions to hold more than 5%).13 
 
2. Informal Financial Regulatory Standards 
 
While the U.S. system emphasizes a system of formal safety nets, 
Japan’s financial sector has historically relied on informal relationships and 
implicit promises between governmental agencies and private banking 
institutions.  Although Japan does have safety nets such as deposit insurance 
in place—similar to FDIC—Japan’s financial sector relies on the public’s 
confidence in the Ministry of Finance and the Bank of Japan to prevent any 
significant instability from occurring in the first place.14 
To maintain confidence, the Japanese government’s policy has been to 
keep the monetary environment at a level where small players can survive, 
and large players can thrive.  Moreover, the government refuses to allow 
banks to fail, unless through a merger with a stronger entity.15 
To keep small banks out of distress, the Bank of Japan has typically 
kept interbank interest rates low.  Overall, interest rates need to be at least 
0.6%-0.7% to cover the operational costs of bank branches.16  Up until 2012, 
even after Japan’s asset bubble burst in the 1990s, the Bank of Japan has 
managed to keep short-term interest rates at around 1%.17 
In return for keeping interest rates healthy, there is an expectation that 
private banking institutions will take responsibility for projects they invest 
in.  In times of distress, the Bank of Japan expects financial institutions to 
monitor and rescue distressed firms, even if there is no legal requirement to 
do so.18  Banks are expected to provide financial support and capital to 
struggling businesses.  In this capacity, Japanese banks take on a duty similar 
to noblesse oblige—an inferred duty of the privileged to act generously and 
fulfill social responsibilities towards those less privileged.   
Through this social contract, private banks take on an exceptional 
amount of risk in both equity and debt through junior-debt, preferred shares 
distributions, common stock distributions, or debt for equity swaps.  These 
 
 13. Id. 
 14. Curtis J. Milhaupt, Japan’s Experience with Deposit Insurance and Failing Banks: 
Implications for 14 Financial Regulatory Design?, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 399 (1999), available 
at http://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol77/iss2/4.  
 15. Id. 
 16. Mitsuru Obe, Shrinking to Survive: Japan’s Banks Face a Quiet Crisis, NIKKEI 
ASIAN REVIEW, Feb. 21, 2018, https://asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/Cover-Story/Shrinking-to-
survive-Japan-s-banks-face-a-quiet-crisis. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Milhaupt, supra note 14, at 410. 
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methods essentially subordinate the bank’s interest below other creditors in 
cases of liquidation.  This is only possible in Japan because banks can take 
on equity stakes, and it increasingly promotes the bank’s relationship as a 
shareholder over that of a typical creditor. 
Finally, because there is (1) an expectation that private banks will bail 
out companies they invested in, and (2) the banks themselves will not be 
allowed to fail, there also exists an expectation that the government is 
responsible for rescuing distressed banking organizations.19  Attempting to 
avoid bank failure, the Ministry of Finance has previously directed big banks 
to absorb or merge with distressed ones, provided government loans, and 
placed government officials onto the boards of troubled banks to take 
monitoring roles.20  Through this informal quid-pro-quo, the Japanese 
government has not depended on deposit insurance as a safety net to provide 
financial stability (like in the U.S.).  Instead, the government strives to instill 
financial stability by supporting the image that Japanese financial institutions 
are stable and too big to fail.   
 
3. Comparative Analysis of  the Japanese Regulatory System 
a.  U.S. Response to Financial Crisis  
 
Japan’s informal regulatory process differs significantly from the U.S. 
system in many ways in actual practice.  During the 2008 financial crisis, the 
U.S. system was especially pronounced.  Though the U.S. prefers major 
institutions not to fail—in early 2008, U.S. regulators made a deal with the 
U.S. Federal Reserve Bank and JP Morgan to bail out the investment banks 
Bear Stearns—the U.S. is ultimately willing to allow a pillar of institutional 
banking fail.21  In September 2008, after failed attempts to form a rescue deal 
of  Lehman Brothers—negotiating with Bank of America, Barclays, and 
Warren Buffett’s Berkshire Hathaway—the U.S. allowed the fourth-largest 
U.S. investment bank to file for bankruptcy.22 
In response to the financial panic that resulted from the Lehman 
collapse, the U.S. opted to strengthen the financial sector’s safety net: 
 
 19. Garrett L. Brodeur, Shareholders As Stakeholders: A Future Paradigm for 
Institutional Activism in Japan, 27 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 291, 297 (2017). 
 20. Milhaupt, supra note 14, at 414. 
 21. Bear Stearns Gets Bailout from the Federal Reserve, CNBC, Mar. 14, 2008, https:// 
www.cnbc.com/id/23630235. 
 22. Larry Elliott & Jill Treanor, Lehman’s fall to earth: the last hours of a Wall Street 
giant, GUARDIAN, Sept. 3, 2009, https://www.theguardian.com/business/2009/sep/03/lehman-
brothers-rescue-bid. 
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FDIC.23  To ensure financial stability, the government temporarily increased 
FDIC insurance to cover $250,000 from $100,000 and changed coverage to 
include some investment products such as Money Market Funds, and 
Certificates of Deposit.24  In 2010, the U.S. government made the FDIC 
changes permanent when President Obama signed the Dodd-Frank Wall 
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act.25 
 
b. Japanese Response to Financial Crisis 
 
In a financial crisis, Japan would have likely acted differently from the 
U.S.  Rather than allowing large institutions to fail and falling back on 
financial safety nets, in the past Japan has instead directed, negotiated, and 
coerced deals to merge distressed institutions with healthy ones.  In 
emergencies, the government would have likely opted to pay for a bailout 
package itself.  By showing the public that banks could never fail, Japan’s 
government ensures a level of financial stability without depending on safety 
nets.  
For example, in the mid-1990s, following the burst asset bubble and a 
weakened economy, many banks were in distress, and the previously 
dependable relationship between the banks and government was at risk.26  As 
the economist Paul Krugman noted, the cozy relationship and expectation of 
bail-outs by the government had created significant “moral hazard” conflicts 
between the banks and the government.27  It was around this time when the 
government started flexing its regulatory muscle. 
In the mid-1990s, seventeen major banks remained in Japan.28  In 1999, 
to shore up confidence, the Financial Supervisory Agency’ (“FSA”) directed 
several of Japan’s major banks to consolidate in order to clean up and 
stabilize their balance sheets.29  Such mergers included one between Chuo 
Trust and Mitsui Trust and another merger between Sanwa Bank and Toyo 
Trust.30  The mergers upheld public confidence and prevented panic, even 
 
 23. See Press Release, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Basic FDIC Insurance 
Coverage Permanently Increased to $250,000 Per Depositor (July 21, 2010), https://www. 
fdic.gov/news/news/press/2010/pr10161.html. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Brodeur, supra note 19, at 297. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Japanese Banking: Loud and Clear, ECONOMIST (Jan. 21, 1999), https://www. 
economist.com/finance-and-28economics/1999/01/21/loud-and-clear. 
 29. Id.  
 30. Id. 
6 - Kobayashi_HICLR_V43-2 (Do Not Delete) 4/24/2020  3:05 PM 
Summer 2020] Japanese Corporate Governance 345 
though Chuo, Mitsui, Sanwa, and Toyo were individually all in financial 
straits. 
Furthermore, when it was not in the best interest of a distressed bank to 
merge with another, the FSA occasionally nationalized the weakened bank—
as it did with Long-Term Credit Bank and Nippon Credit Bank—or it 
coerced banks into taking injections of public funds to stabilize its balance 
sheet.31  Such forceful tactics from the government also encouraged weaker 
banks to find partners to merge with on their own initiative—aware that 
failure to act risked significant government intervention.   
Fulfilling its goal to prevent a failed bank at all costs, the FSA continued 
to press banks to stabilize their balance sheets through the 2000s.32  As late 
as 2004, the FSA’s policies managed to push Mitsubishi Tokyo Financial 
Group and UFJ (a bank created from the merger of Sanwa Bank, Tokai Bank, 
and Toyo Trust & Banking) into another merger.  The resulting Mitsubishi 
UFJ Financial Group (“MUFG”) created the world’s largest bank at the 
time—a financial giant that was once five separate banks only two decades 
before.33   
 
c.   Japan’s Old System in Trouble 
 
In recent events, the Japanese government has had issues keeping 
interest rates at healthy levels.  In 2012, as a part of the Abenomics reforms, 
Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s government instructed the Bank of Japan to 
lower interest rates to levels below the 0.6%-0.7% level required for bank 
branches to remain operational.34  In 2016, interest rates went negative.35  
Luckily, due to the banking consolidation in the 1990s and 2000s, the few 
remaining banks had been financially stable enough to handle the low-
interest environment.  However, if the current environment continues, it is 
unknown how long the banks will last.   
The Bank of Japan has also made other uncharacteristic moves that have 
signaled an eroding relationship between the government and banks.  While 
there have been some public arguments between Haruhiko Kuroda (the 
governor of the Bank of Japan) and MUFG President Nobuyuki Hirano, the 
 
 31. ECONOMIST, supra note 28. 
 32. Japan’s Banks: Swallow Hard, ECONOMIST (July 15, 2004), https://www.econo 
mist.com/finance-and-economics/2004/07/15/swallow-hard. 
 33. Id.   
 34. Obe, supra note 16. 
 35. Jonathan Soble, Japan’s Negative Interest Rates Explained, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 21, 
2016), www.nytimes.com/2016/09/21/business/international/japan-boj-negative-interest-rates.html. 
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relationship was clearly in turmoil when the Bank of Japan sidelined Hirano 
from being considered for a post in the Central Bank.36   
Sidelining Hirano broke a historical tradition, leaving the Bank of Japan 
without a governor from a private bank for the first time.  Traditionally, the 
Bank of Japan would alternate at least one representative between the three 
megabanks—MUFG, Sumitomo Mitsui Banking Corporation, and Mizuho 
Bank—on their Board of Governors.  In prior years, Makoto Usami—the 
former president of MUFG—and three other Mitsubishi bank alumni served 
as governors for the Bank of Japan.37 
 
4. Recent Regulatory Trends on Securities Regulation 
 
Apart from banking, Japanese securities laws have also begun to change 
into those more reminiscent to the U.K. and the U.S.  Specifically, the 
regulatory framework for hostile takeovers have evolved.  Before this, 
Japan’s regulatory board was very protective of its domestic industries.  As 
outlined in the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Act, “any foreign 
investor intending to make an ‘inward and direct investment’ in a Japanese 
corporation must notify in advance and receive permission from the Minister 
of Finance and any other ministry with jurisdiction over the target 
corporation.”38  In the act, “inward and direct investment” included any 
acquisition of shares in a Japanese listed corporation in which, “at least ten 
percent of the corporation’s shares will be held by a nonresident individual 
after completion of the acquisition.”39  Essentially, the Japanese government 
put large amounts of red tape to prevent the foreign acquisition of domestic 
companies—making the regulatory changes in the 1990s and early 2000s 
particularly exciting to foreign investors.   
In 1990, Japan reformed the Securities and Exchange Act, patterned 
after U.K. legislation to spur foreign investment.40  Regardless, the Foreign 
Exchange and Foreign Trade Act has not significantly changed, and the 
government can still intervene in any acquisitions of 10% or above.  The 
government’s power to block deals was utilized as recently in 2008 when the 
government prevented a British hedge fund from taking 20% in Electric 
 
 36. Kosuke Takami, BOJ vs. Mitsubishi: Detente, or maybe not? NIKKEI ASIAN REVIEW 
(Jan. 1, 2018), https://asia.nikkei.com/Economy/BOJ-vs-Mitsubishi-Detente-or-maybe-not. 
 37. Id.  
 38. Brodeur, supra note 19, at 299. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Dan W. Puchniak & Masafumi Nakahigashi, The Enigma of Hostile Takeovers in 
Japan: Bidder Beware, 15 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 4, 6 (2018). 
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Power Development Co.41  Fifteen years after the 1990 reforms, in 2005, the 
Japanese government again became more protective, issuing additional 
takeover guidelines that substantially incorporated Delaware jurisprudence 
concerning takeover defenses—notably the “poison pill.”42 
Nonetheless, with the implementation of new measures in the 1990s, 
there was speculation that previously protected Japanese firms would be 
open to hostile takeovers in a frenzy similar to that of the U.S. in the 1980s.43  
Commentators saw large amounts of value in the Japanese takeover market; 
as one article from the Economist noted, “there [were] pots of gold hidden 
everywhere.”44  The article cited several analysts who believed 10% of listed 
public companies in Japan had break-up values more than twice the current 
market value at the time.45   
Furthermore, many believed that hostile takeovers would bring in other 
expected benefits.  Such benefits included lowered shareholder-manager 
agency costs and the implementation of efficient corporate restructuring.46   
However, despite overall foreign ownership of Japanese stocks 
increasing from 4.7% in 1990 to 29.8% in 2015,47 Japan’s “takeover-
friendly” environment did not produce any significant hostile takeovers.48  In 
the end, many scholars believe takeover activism to have peaked in 2008—
though such activism has not yet come to a complete end.49 
 
C.  Understanding the Keiretsu Organizational System 
1. Organization and Makeup of the Keiretsu Group 
 
As noted before, the Keiretsu is a corporate group characterized by a 
complex web of intercorporate ownership centered around a bank.50  It 
should be emphasized that despite having the same name, many Keiretsu 
related companies are independent corporate entities, not partially or wholly 
owned subsidiaries of each other (unlike the Zaibatsu or Chaebol model 
where a central holding company consolidates equity of all related 
companies).  However, despite this fragmentation, at its height, the Tokyo 
 
 41. Id. at 299. 
 42. Brodeur, supra note 19, at 299. 
 43. Puchniak, supra note 40, at 13. 
 44. Id. at 6. 
 45. Id.  
 46. Id. at 11. 
 47. Brodeur, supra note 19, at 298. 
 48. Puchniak, supra note 40, at 8. 
 49. Brodeur, supra note 19, at 303. 
 50. Encyclopaedia Britannica, supra note 9. 
6 - Kobayashi_HICLR_V43-2 (Do Not Delete) 4/24/2020  3:05 PM 
348 Hastings Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. [Vol. 43:2 
Stock Exchange estimated that Keiretsu groups held 43% of the exchange’s 
shares through cross-holdings.51   
An example of a Keiretsu is the Mitsubishi group.  Today, the 
overarching Mitsubishi name includes over 25 corporate entities that 
include: Mitsubishi Corp (“MC”), Mitsubishi Heavy Industries (“MHI”), 
MUFG, Meiji Yasuda Life Insurance Co. (“Meiji Ins.”), Tokio Marine 
Holdings (insurance), Kirin Holdings (beer), Nikon (cameras), as well as  
Mitsubishi Motors (“MMC”), Chemicals, Electric, Materials, Energy, etc.52  
But despite being entirely separate entities, they each own small equity 
holdings of one another.  For instance, approximately 12% of MHI is held 
between MC, MUFG, Meiji Ins., Tokyo Marine Holdings, and Mitsubishi 
Electric Corp—MUFG being the most significant equity holder.53  
Throughout this report, the focus will primarily concentrate on the 
Mitsubishi Keiretsu, because it is one of the most robust corporate groups, 
and because it has experienced many situations typically seen as a result of 
the Keiretsu system.   
 
2.  The Keiretsu’s Historical Similarities to U.S.  
 
The chief legal barriers separating the U.S. and Japan are the ability of 
banks to hold equity ownership in other firms regularly.  On another note, 
most cross-holdings seen in Japan would be considered too insignificant and 
small to trigger a U.S. Williams Act’s 5% disclosure requirement.  The 
Williams Act, passed in the U.S. in the 1960s, was in response to a wave of 
unannounced hostile takeovers.  The Act requires disclosure from anyone 
who holds more than 5% of outstanding shares of a corporation, an amount 
the U.S. government considers to be a significant level of ownership.54   
Referring back to MHI’s ownership example, the 12% stake of 
Mitsubishi’s Keiretsu ownership in MHI included Meiji Ins., MC, 
Mitsubishi Electric, and Tokio Marine each holding 2.37%, 1.58%, 1.13%, 
and 0.97% respectively—all amounts the U.S. system would consider 
insignificant.55  Although Japan only allows banks a maximum holding of 
 
 51. Brodeur, supra note 19, at 298. 
 52. See Brian Twomey, Understanding Japanese Keiretsu, INVESTOPEDIA (Mar. 9, 2018), 
https://www.investopedia.com/articles/economics/09/japanese-keiretsu.asp; The Mitsubishi 
Group: All in the Family, ECONOMIST (May. 27, 2004), https://www.economist.com/bus 
iness/2004/05/27/all-in-the-family. 
 53. Mitsubishi Heavy Industries Ltd, BLOOMBERG LAW, https://www.bloomberglaw. 
com/company/holdings/7011 JP Equity (last visited Dec. 25, 2018). 
 54. James Chen, Williams Act, INVESTOPEDIA (Mar. 31, 2018), https://www.investop 
edia.com/terms/w/williamsact.asp. 
 55. Mitsubishi Heavy Industries Ltd, supra note 51. 
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5% of equity ownership, bank ownership, in conjunction with the 
multiplicity of cross-holdings, has drastically separated the corporate 
environment in Japan from the U.S.56 
On a historical note, the difference between the U.S. and Japan has not 
always been so stark.  In the late nineteenth century, both the U.S. and Japan 
were forming similar corporate groups tethered together by financial 
organizations.  Similar to the Zaibatsu system, the U.S. developed groups 
known as “trusts,” when significant U.S. banking organizations began to 
expand outside of finance and banking. 
An example of U.S. trusts, the banker J.P. Morgan (founder of the now 
JP Morgan Chase) was instrumental in forming General Electric Co. and 
U.S. Steel.57  The original Mellon Bank (now BNY Mellon) founded and 
managed what is now Alcoa (Aluminum), Gulf Oil (Chevron-Texaco), and 
manufacturer Westinghouse.58  While Mellon would eventually become the 
U.S. Secretary of the Treasury and become ex-officio chairman of the 
original Federal Reserve Act, Morgan was often the target of public criticism 
and congressional investigations.   
Following the financial crises in 1895 and 1907, Congress passed the 
Clayton Antitrust Act of 1914.59  Following the Great Depression in 1929, 
Congress enacted Glass-Steagall in 1933.60  The legislation passed by Congress 
in this period forced many trusts to break up, leading to the current U.S. 
economic environment today.  Under this model, General Douglas MacArthur 
of the U.S. Army tore apart Japan’s Zaibatsu groups in hopes of creating a 
similar U.S. system after WWII, forcing Japanese corporations to transition to 
the Keiretsu system to keep former corporate relationships intact.61 
 
3. Personal Ties Within the Keiretsu 
 
Despite the formal corporate relationships tethered together by cross-
holdings of one another, one cannot understand the Keiretsu system from a 
 
 56. Morck, supra note 1, at 542. 
 57. J.P. Morgan, HISTORY.COM (Nov. 9, 2009), https://www.history.com/topics/19th-
century/john-pierpont-morgan (last visited Dec. 25, 2018). 
 58. See Abram Brown & Alex Morrell, 175 Years Later, The Mellons Have Never Been 
Richer. How’d They Do It?, FORBES (July 8, 2014), https://www.forbes.com/sites/abram 
brown/2014/07/08/175-years-later-the-mellons-have-never-been-richer-howd-they-do-it/#79 
e815e67489; Andrew W. Mellon, FEDERAL RESERVE HISTORY, https://www.federalrese 
rvehistory.org/people/andrew_w_mellon (last visited Dec. 25, 2018). 
 59. 15 U.S.C. § 12 (2012). 
 60. 12 U.S.C. § 227 (1935). 
 61. Yes, General, ECONOMIST (Dec. 23, 1999), https://www.economist.com/business/ 
1999/12/23/yes-general. 
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strict ownership perspective, as that is only half the story.  After all, other 
non-Mitsubishi Keiretsu groups partially own MHI, and yet, ten out of its 
eleven board of directors are still directly related to MHI, MC, MMC, 
MUFG, and Tokio Marine Ins. Corp.62  In fact, it is the informal and 
personal—near family-like—relationships between the executives that 
cement the bonds of the Keiretsu.   
For instance, executives from different Mitsubishi corporations 
reportedly get together on the second Friday of every month to solidify social 
ties among themselves.63  Back in 1995, when Mitsubishi Bank and Bank of 
Tokyo announced they were to merge into MUFG, Tsuneo Wakai, the 
president of Mitsubishi Bank at the time, told reporters that different bank 
presidents often got together in various social and drinking events.64  It was 
at these events where the two bank presidents became good friends—a 
relationship that led both men to endorse the merger as soon as talks began.65 
Within Keiretsu groups, personal ties between the executives of the 
related companies had guided executives and employees alike to prefer 
products from their own Keiretsu groups.  Within Mitsubishi, this preference 
ranged from Mitsubishi steel for cars and Kirin beer at bars.  While today, 
corporate loyalty is not as strict as it once was—for instance, in 2003, MHI’s 
Nagasaki plant previously restricted garage spaces exclusively to Mitsubishi 
cars—corporate loyalties remain strong to one another.66  Absent those 
personal relationships, some Japanese partnered groups or alliances have 
witnessed spectacular ends (discussed below in Nissan-Renault-Mitsubishi 
Alliance).   
 
4. Stable Shareholders 
 
In addition to the Keiretsu organizations, there is also an overarching 
classification known as “stable shareholders.”  Similar to Keiretsu 
relationships, these shareholders generally consist of, “banks, insurance 
companies or other nonfinancial Japanese companies that are ‘typically 
engaged in some sort of business transaction with the issuer corporation.’”67  
Stable shareholders and Keiretsu ownership are not mutually exclusive, and 
 
 62. Mitsubishi Heavy Industries Ltd, supra note 51. 
 63. ECONOMIST, supra note 52. 
 64. Sheryl WuDunn, International Business; Merger to Create New Japan Bank, 
World’s Largest, N.Y. TIMES  (Mar. 29, 1995), https://www.nytimes.com/1995/03/29/us/ 
international-business-merger-to-create-new-japan-bank-world-s-largest.html. 
 65. Id. 
 66. The Mitsubishi Group: All in the Family, supra note 53. 
 67. Puchniak, supra note 40, at 17. 
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many recognize Keiretsu relationships as a sub-classification of stable 
shareholders.   
Non-Keiretsu stable shareholders typically hold less than 5% of 
outstanding shares, and the primary purpose of that ownership is to reinforce 
or establish a long-term relationship between the firms’ management and not 
necessarily as an investment.68  In doing so, when an issuing firm is under 
threat of a hostile takeover, the share-holding firm is more inclined to protect 
the current management.  The protection is not merely loyalty bias, but 
protecting the current management is seen as being beneficial to protect 
current contracts and deals.  Although most takeover offers hold a hefty 
premium, protection of current business between the two firms seems to be 
preferred.   
In the takeover bid of an iconic Japanese brand commonly known as 
Bulldog sauce (“Bulldog”), the solidarity of the stable shareholders was seen 
in practice.69  In 2007, a U.S. hedge fund, Steel Partners, held approximately 
11% of Bulldog’s shares and attempted a hostile takeover.  In response, 
Bulldog’s board set forth a vote to allow poison pill procedures to protect 
themselves.70  Practically, all shareholders except for the insurgent party 
voted for the measures, gaining over 85% of the vote.71  Despite the hefty 
premium offered, a majority of stockholders rallied around Bulldog’s current 
management—a majority of these shareholders believed to be stable 
shareholders of the brand.72 
 
5. Benefits of the Keiretsu System 
 
While there are several advantages seen in the Keiretsu system, many 
of these benefits are double-edged.73  The original purpose of the Keiretsu 
was as a defense against hostile takeovers.74  Following the U.S. occupation 
and breakup of the Zaibatsu organizations, high-profile takeovers plagued 
Japan in the 50s and 60s.75  By allowing banks to own equity in other 
companies, banks recreated their former Zaibatsu groups and directed other 
members to form the complex web of cross-holdings seen today.  This 
 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Mizuki Hayashi, Corporate Ownership and Governance Reforms in Japan: 
Influence of Globalization and U.S. Practice, 26 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 315, 343 (2013). 
 74. Morck, supra note 1 at 541-42. 
 75. Id. 
6 - Kobayashi_HICLR_V43-2 (Do Not Delete) 4/24/2020  3:05 PM 
352 Hastings Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. [Vol. 43:2 
intricate web effectively protected managers from outside threats.  While this 
is considered beneficial for the protection of corporate managers, it precludes 
the “shareholder-first” mentality seen in the U.S. that protects managers at 
the cost of proper decision-making. 
Furthermore, Keiretsu organizations support each other to promote 
confidence in affiliated corporations.  Essential to this support network is the 
banking organization.  The support of the banking arm is necessary because 
they act as both a shareholder and creditor—which is why even a 5% 
ownership substantially separates the U.S. and Japanese corporate system.76 
 
a. The U.S. Perspective on Creditor and Shareholder Rights 
 
In the U.S., shareholders and creditors are two separate groups with 
different rights and different priorities.  A shareholder will look at a company 
in a long-term view and may be willing to forgo today’s earnings for brighter 
prospects in the future.  A creditor, on the other hand, has a set timeframe, 
limited by the term set in the loan.  Furthermore, a creditor only cares if 
earnings are plentiful and stable enough to cover the loan and interest, and 
therefore dislikes risky business and is willing to pursue aggressive 
liquidation of assets in bankruptcy or financial distress.   
The U.S. tries to keep creditor and shareholder interests completely 
separate, preventing U.S. commercial banks from owning equity in other 
companies.  Historically, attempts in the U.S. to blur this line have been 
struck down by the U.S. court system.  In the 1958 case, Costello v. Fazio, 
two of three business partners, attempted to switch their equity positions into 
creditor positions within their failing business.77  Using a process known as 
equitable insubordination, the court rearranged the debt-equity structure in 
bankruptcy to ensure all three business partners were liable.78  Among other 
things, this case showed the court’s insistence on keeping creditors and 
shareholders separate.  
 
b. Japan’s System of Intertwining of Creditors and Shareholders 
 
Overall, the Keiretsu bank ownership system flips the U.S. system’s 
logic on its head.  By having a bank act as both a creditor and shareholder, 
many of the conflicts of interest between the two classes are subdued.  This 
intertwined interest leads to several beneficial arrangements.  For example, 
non-financial members of a Keiretsu sometimes have beneficial loan 
 
 76. Morck, supra note 1. 
 77. Costello v. Fazio, 256 F.2d 903, 910 (9th Cir. 1958). 
 78. Id. 
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agreements compared to that of independent businesses.  While informal 
loyalty influences some of these benefits, there are more practical reasons 
why shareholding banks are willing to lend to Keiretsu members. 
One reason for this is the greater transparency between the two 
corporations.  Because the bank acts as both a creditor and a shareholder, the 
loan-taking firm is more willing to reveal the internal workings and financial 
information to the bank—resolving the issue of information asymmetry.  
Utilizing the Keiretsu relationship, non-banking corporations will rarely be 
underfinanced or undercapitalized as the Keiretsu bank will be willing to 
provide capital for a majority of reasonable projects.  Thanks to this access, 
Keiretsu organizations will usually recover faster in times of economic 
downturns.79  However, in the long-run, after a quick recovery, the Keiretsu 
firms’ stock prices tend to stall and keep track with the overall Japanese 
economy.80 
Furthermore, acting as a shareholder, banks will often choose not to 
pursue liquidation in troubled financial times aggressively—and, in fact, will 
often entrench themselves more as shareholders.  In the U.S., if a company 
is in distress, creditors may demand the company to liquidate, even if there 
are promising prospects for that firm.  The Keiretsu system will alternatively 
choose to provide the indebted company additional support when in financial 
straits, assisting in refinancing instead of liquidating.   
As well as supporting internal Keiretsu financing, the banking 
organization lowers the cost of outside financing as well.  When in need of 
financing, the Keiretsu bank will often act as the leading bank to create 
syndicates for debt financing and will act as the lead underwriter to bring in 
capital.  Additionally, during times of financial distress, the bank will also 
serve as a guarantor to other creditors in order to keep interest rates 
subdued.81   
For their assistance, the Keiretsu banks also benefit from the 
relationship.  With increased financial transparency, banks use more 
accessible and reliable information to make better investment decisions.  
Additionally, as both a creditor and shareholder, banking institutions tend to 
proportionally have a more considerable influence on corporate decisions 
than what their limited 5% equity interest would typically imply.82  Banks, 
therefore, take a more significant monitoring role of the affiliated firms, and 
in times of financial distress, will appoint their managers or direct other 
 
 79. Morck, supra note 1. 
 80. MSBHF Mitsubishi Corp Stock Quote Price, MORNINGSTAR, https://www.morn 
ingstar.com/stocks/pinx/msbhf/quote.html (last visited Dec. 25, 2018). 
 81. Morck, supra note 1, at 540. 
 82. Morck, supra note 1. 
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Keiretsu affiliated managers to top executive roles in the troubled firms to 
shift corporate strategy. 
 
6. Downsides to the Keiretsu System 
a. Corporate Entrenchment 
 
As noted above, many of the benefits of the Keiretsu system can end up 
being a liability.  One of these detriments includes overly entrenched 
management.  The Keiretsu system, as an anti-takeover defense, works 
almost a little too well.  The managers of the companies are never really 
under external threat and tend not to react quickly to threats compared to 
U.S. companies.  When there is a foreign joint venture or alliance, it is more 
likely due to a Japanese Keiretsu group letting others in, instead of someone 
forcing themselves in from the outside.   
In the U.S., one of the most effective and common takeover defenses 
has been the poison pill.  The overall result of a poison pill defense will 
prevent a hostile acquisition from taking place unless the merger offer is 
genuinely attractive to the shareholders.  Unlike Keiretsu solidarity—which 
acts as a near-absolute bar from hostile takeovers—the poison pill on its own 
raises the cost of the acquisitions, but it does not ultimate rule out the 
possibility of an acquisition or merger.  Such corporate indifference to 
outside threats has generally been linked to lower performance.   
Another example of indifferent management plaguing the old guard of 
the Japanese banking industry today revolves around their inability to react 
quickly or begin reform efforts.  Failing to act earlier, large Japanese 
megabanks have only recently started to implement reforms in digitization 
and the cutting of low-performing branches.83   
Large commercial Keiretsu banks, such as MUFG, Sumitomo Mitsui 
Banking Corporation, and Mizuho Bank, have been particularly bad in 
digitization.  Smaller E-banks in Japan have been performing much better.  
In 2017, MUFG, Sumitomo and Mizuho have had approximately a 5%-7% 
growth in deposits, however, popular E-banks such as SBI Sumishin Net 
Bank (an old spun off venture between Soft Bank and Sumitomo Mitsui) and 
Rakuten Bank (an E-commerce company) have had growth rates of 14% and 
28% respectively.84  Furthermore, those small E-banks have been opening 
accounts at a rate of about 9%-12% a year.85  These smaller banks have been 
able to increase their market share by keeping costs low (for instance, by not 
having physical branches).  In doing so, the smaller banks like SBI Sumishin 
 
 83. Obe, supra note 16. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. 
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Net Bank have been offering fixed mortgages at rates of 1.17% while the 
other major banks have only been able to offer 1.28%.86 
In another sign of the slow adaptation, we look at the closing rate of 
Japanese bank branches.  Since 2009, the U.S. has downsized its physical 
branch presence, closing nearly 10,000 branches from its peak.87  In the U.K., 
banks have closed physical branches at an average of 300 branches a year 
since the late 1980s.88  Japan, on the other hand, in the nine years from 2007 
to 2016, actually increased the number of branches and the number of 
employees.89   
In 2017, the three leading Japanese banks announced plans to begin 
downsizing branches and cutting a total of 32,000 positions; it comes about 
ten years after the U.S. began doing so.90  Furthermore, this delay in 
responding has come at a cost: in 2016, the return on assets (“ROA”) from 
Japanese banks was around 0.3%, whereas the banks in “shareholder-first” 
regions (mostly former British dominions) such as the U.S., U.K., Australia, 
Hong Kong, and Singapore have had ROAs of 1.0%, 0.8%, 0.7%, 1.1%, and 
0.9% respectively.91   
 
b.  Keiretsu Corporate Loyalty Bias 
 
Corporate loyalty is also a positive and negative aspect of the Keiretsu 
system.  Such loyalty often prevents corporations from picking the most 
rational or economical solution, preferring related firms instead.  While all 
organizations around the world tend to have some level of loyalty biases, it 
is especially prevalent in the Keiretsu groups.  As noted before, in the past, 
some Mitsubishi manufacturing plants only allowed Mitsubishi cars to park 
in the garage, Mitsubishi brand materials were preferred over cheaper or 
better alternatives, and employees were pressured into only drinking Kirin 
beer.92   
Despite historically strong loyalty biases at Mitsubishi in particular, 
recently, these loyalties have started to wane.  On a corporate level, MHI has 
increasingly purchased computer equipment from outsiders such as Hitachi 
and Toshiba over Mitsubishi Electric, individual employees no longer feel 
 
 86. Id. 
 87. The closing of American bank branches, ECONOMIST (July 27, 2017), https://www. 
economist.com/finance-and-economics/2017/07/27/the-closing-of-american-bank-branches. 
 88. Obe, supra note 16. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. 
 92. The Mitsubishi Group: All in the Family, supra note 61. 
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required to purchase Mitsubishi related products such as Kirin beer or Nikon 
cameras, and German DaimlerChrysler was allowed to take a 34% equity 
stake in Mitsubishi Motors.93  Furthermore, starting with the merger of Bank 
of Tokyo and Mitsubishi in the 1990s, the Mitsubishi Keiretsu’s core 
business allowed itself to be injected with outsiders.94  In an increasingly 
competitive global economy, Keiretsu groups have begun to reduce loyalty 
biases, though not wholly. 
 
c. Groupthink and Other Egregious Issue 
 
Similar to other inefficiencies, cohesive Keiretsu ties have also led to 
excessive groupthink, occasionally leading to scandal and fraud.  Though 
such cohesion allows these corporations to act uniformly, it tends to restrict 
their ability to evaluate their own decisions.95  Such insider-thinking was 
present in the case regarding the Olympus scandal.   
In 2011, Olympus appointed its very first foreign President, Michael 
Woodward, onto the board.96  Woodward’ then discovered several instances 
of financial reporting fraud regarding purchases of valueless companies and 
“advisory fees” to the total amount of $1.7 billion in suspicious transactions 
dating back to the 1990s—possibly involving even the Yakuza.97  Woodward 
went to the chairman (Kikukawa), the outside auditors, the board of 
directors, and even to business journals looking for answers; he brought in 
his own forensic accountants to find the answers he sought, but to no avail—
he received the silent treatment from all informed parties.98  Six months into 
the job, Woodward was called into a meeting where he was unanimously 
sacked by the entire board of directors lead by Kikukawa.99 
As Woodward soon realized, the board was not the only one in on it.  
As he went to the press, he noted how docile the politicians and regulators 
were as the scandal hit the news worldwide, causing the stock to drop by 
80%.100  When Woodward tried to rally stockholders to remove the board of 
directors, he met resistance from Olympus’s Keiretsu group, centered around 
 
 93. Id.   
 94. Id.   
 95. Hayashi, supra note 70, at 334. 
 96. Paying a price for doing what’s right, ECONOMIST (Nov. 24, 2012), https://www. 
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the banking giant, the Sumitomo Mitsui Banking Corporation.101  His 
attempt failed miserably, and he was forced to leave Olympus. 
In the end, Woodard recalls realizing that, “in everyone’s eyes Mr. 
Kikukawa was protecting a great company and its employees without 
personal gain; this was a victimless accounting fudge; and after spending a 
decade trying to get rid of the mess, they took the bold step of choosing a 
foreign boss to put the company back on the right course—only to see their 
trust betrayed.”102  In the U.S., financial fraud is an especially egregious 
crime—especially after Enron, WorldCom, and the financial crisis in 
general—but in the eyes of Japanese managers and politicians, this cover-up 
was nothing but a simple misunderstanding.  As the Keiretsu system 
continues to protect its own from financial distress, corporate takeovers, and 
even fraud, it is no surprise that outsiders have had difficulty in the Japanese 
takeover market.   
 
III. Keiretsu Groups and Informal Loyalty Ties in Practice 
A. The Entrenchment of Corporate Loyalties: Comparing Nissan’s 
Alliance to Mitsubishi’s 
 
Examples of the downside of Keiretsu group loyalty ties can be seen in 
2000 regarding Mitsubishi Motors Corporation (“MMC”).  In 2000, 
DaimlerChrysler (“Daimler”) decided to create an alliance with MMC and 
eventually held a 37% stake in the company.103  This decision followed 
Renault’s newly formed alliance with Nissan in 1999.104   
Due to economic woes in Japan, automakers were struggling and were 
more willing to open themselves up to foreign alliances and cooperation.  
Nissan was backed by the Fuyo Keiretsu, which was considerably weaker 
than that of the Mitsubishi Keiretsu in terms of influence, strength, and 
solidarity; a factor that many contribute to Nissan’s success in turning itself 
around, while Mitsubishi’s corporate entrenchment would lead itself into a 
deeper pit a few years later.  As a result, the Fuyo Keiretsu’s weakness 
allowed Renault to take the lion’s share of Nissan ownership but was able to 
instill painful reforms, managing to bring Nissan back to profitability.105   
 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. 
 103. The Mitsubishi Group: All in the Family, supra note 53. 
 104. Renault-Nissan-Mitsubishi has become the world’s biggest carmaker, ECONOMIST 
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In 1999 when the Nissan-Renault alliance was formed, Nissan had net 
losses of ¥684 billion, debt of ¥1.3 trillion, and an operating profit margin of 
1.4%.106  However, by the end of 2001, Nissan had ¥372 billion of profit, cut 
its debt down approximately by two-thirds to ¥432 billion, and their 
operating margin increased more than five-fold to 7.9%.107  On the other 
hand, Mitsubishi Motors in 2000 had a net loss of ¥279 billion,108 and while 
there were encouraging signs of a ¥37 billion net profit in 2002,109 
Mitsubishi’s net loss fell back down to ¥215 billion in 2003.110   
Some blamed the Mitsubishi group’s entrenchment for the lack of 
necessary reforms.111  By the end of 2001 (two years after the establishment 
of the alliance), Nissan’s nine-member board (not including outside auditors) 
included four non-Japanese members, including Carlos Ghosn, the president, 
and creator of the Nissan-Renault Alliance—requiring just one of the five 
Japanese member’s support to make a decision.112  MMC, on the other hand, 
had three non-Japanese board members out of eight—requiring the support 
of two of the five Japanese Mitsubishi executives to make decisions.113   
Later in 2003, when the overall Mitsubishi group bailed out MMC 
(discussed below), only two out of twelve board members were non-
Japanese.  To emphasize this rift in relations, in the 2004 MMC annual 
report, there were no photos of the non-Japanese directors and their names 
are noticeably separated from the other highlighted Japanese board 
members.114  In all, despite DaimlerChrysler holding a significant stake in 
Mitsubishi Motors, reform attempts were stifled by the presence of other 
Mitsubishi affiliated members.  In contrast to Nissan’s case, the lower share 
of Fuyo affiliated directors provided a lower level of resistance, which 
increased the chances for Nissan to pull off a successful turnaround.   
 
 
 106. Nissan Motor Co, Ltd., Annual Report: Year Ended March 31, 2000 (2000), https:// 
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B.Utilization of the Keiretsu Financial Support Network 
 
As an example of both strong Keiretsu solidarity but an unfavorable 
investment, we now look to the Mitsubishi group’s bailout of MMC in 2004.  
After losing ¥215 billion in 2003, Daimler decided to stop supporting the 
failing MMC.115  Having nowhere else to ask for assistance, MMC asked 
Mitsubishi’s financial arm for assistance and, utilizing the Keiretsu 
organization, the whole of Mitsubishi was able to provide a support package 
totaling ¥210 billion.  Furthermore, MUFG swapped an additional ¥130 
billion of debt for equity, essentially wiping ¥130 billion worth of debt and 
respective interest payments off of MMC’s liabilities.116 
At this point, MMC was one of—if not the weakest of—the Mitsubishi 
corporations.  Furthermore, many analysts and outsiders had given up on the 
company and expected MMC to fail.  In 2004, MMC sales in the U.S. fell 
by 25.6%, and 38.8% in Japan.  Furthermore, the 2004 sales volume in Japan 
was 55.4% below the sales volume of 1995, nearly ten years before and was 
expected to keep falling.117  Despite the 37% stake it had at the time, Daimler 
decided that it was time to cut MMC off life support. 
By all means, any further investment in MMC was considered a poor 
investment decision, and yet both a combination of formal and informal 
Keiretsu ties allowed it to survive.  However, looking deeper into the 
underlying relationships, the decision and actions by the Mitsubishi group 
make much more sense.   
First, despite Daimler holding a significant stake in MMC, other 
Mitsubishi firms still had fairly notable stakes in MMC as well.  Before the 
bailout, MC, MHI, and MUFG held a total of 26% of MMC, with MHI 
holding the largest share.118  MUFG, as the principal financing arm of 
Mitsubishi, took the lead on the bailout deal but did not cover everything 
itself.  Instead, Mitsubishi tapped the existing Keiretsu organization for 
assistance.  Though the rescue’s share distribution was for ¥210 billion, ¥140 
billion was spread between other members of the Mitsubishi groups, with 
MC, MHI, and MUFG each taking on ¥40 billion respectively.  Furthermore, 
the group was able to tap its informal connections by bringing in Phoenix 
Capital, a venture fund started by former employees of MUFG and its 
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preceding bank organizations.119  Despite not holding the formal ownership 
ties as the other Mitsubishi corporations had, the informal loyalty of previous 
employees locked in an additional ¥70 billion of capital.120 
Regarding the form of the rescue, share distributions increased 
Mitsubishi’s overall equity stake, further integrating the separate Mitsubishi 
members into MMC.  These share distributions also pushed out 
DaimlerChrysler in the process by diluting their shares.  Furthermore, not 
only did this increase Mitsubishi’s equity stake, but by subordinating their 
stakes through share distributions and the utilization of a debt for equity 
swap, the group was able to relieve MMC’s external debt pressures.  By 
selecting this form of financing, Mitsubishi increased its investment risk but 
was able to provide financial relief without additional debt stress on MMC.  
By increasing its equity share, Mitsubishi also began to enforce its 
monitoring ability, placing ten former Mitsubishi affiliated executives on the 
board of twelve.  By 2004, MMC’s board completely changed, led by 
Yoichiro Okazaki, a former executive of MHI.121  Okazaki brought nine 
other executives from Mitsubishi affiliated industrial corporations, though a 
majority were from MHI.122  In doing so—despite DaimlerChrysler still 
having a significant stake—the Mitsubishi group collectively hijacked 
operations of MMC to carry out its own reforms with the Mitsubishi Keiretsu 
support—support DaimlerChrysler had hoped for in the years before.   
Ultimately, the reforms implemented by the general Mitsubishi group 
produced mixed results.  In 2005, Yoichiro Okazaki and a few other 
executives resigned amid a scandal, and the Mitsubishi group companies 
needed to inject an additional ¥250 billion of fresh capital into MMC.123  
While the support allowed Mitsubishi to survive, MMC did not return to 
profitability until 2006.  Moreover, while the firm was able to survive and 
eventually become profitable, the cash provided by the other Mitsubishi 
corporations could have been used more efficiently on other projects. 
In the U.S., it would have been difficult to find firms willing to fund a 
zombie-like firm such as MMC in the early 2000s.  Because U.S. banks have 
no equity interest, as debtors, they are more likely to ask for liquidation of 
assets rather than throwing life-lines to failing companies.  Furthermore, 
because creditors and shareholders are commonly separate entities, 
liquidations are more likely to occur in the U.S. than to Japanese Keiretsu 
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firms.  Retailers such as Toys“R”‘Us, Sears, Sports Authority, and Circuit 
City are all examples of large corporations who failed to keep up with the 
times and were forced to liquidate their assets to cover creditor debt.124  
These liquidations have occurred without much complaint from the 
government and have been supported by the U.S. financial system.   
Indeed, during the 1990s, following Japan’s economic bubble, many of 
the large Keiretsu banks were keeping “legions of inefficient industries and 
‘zombie firms’ on life support.”125  Furthermore, it was because of these of 
Keiretsu groups—thought to be poster-child of inefficient corporations—
that many pundits believed that the securities reform in the 1990s would 
usher in an age of hostile corporate takeovers, similar to that in the U.S. in 
the 1980s.126  However, as seen in Mitsubishi’s ability to control the board 
of MMC, this turned out not to be the case.  As some have noted, Japan does 
not need hostile takeovers because the benefits of such takeovers—
monitoring, financing, and corporate restructuring—are the same duties 
Keiretsu groups take when saving a distressed member, but in a manner some 
saw as more efficient.127  
As noted at the beginning of this paper, Japan’s financial stability is 
partially based on the expectation that banks would be responsible for their 
investments and partner groups.  Therefore, the government and Japanese 
society, in general, was not only willing to accept the risky, profitless steps 
taken by the Mitsubishi group in bailing out MMC, but rather, expected it to 
do so.  In contrast to the U.S.’s shareholder first mentality, such investments 
would never have happened.  Glass-Steagall was intended to “provide for the 
safer and more effective use of the assets of banks, to regulate interbank 
control, to prevent the undue diversion of funds into speculative operations, 
and for other purposes.”128  Arguably, this is precisely what Mitsubishi and 
MUFG had done when it invested and supported the weakened MMC. 
 
C.Mistake of Ignoring Japanese Norms of Informal Corporate Ties 
 
Though support from Keiretsu groups is considered to be an occasional 
cause of bad investment, failure to acknowledge the informal system of 
loyalty and trust is also a mistake in itself.  In a separate example, we look 
 
 124. Phil Wahba & John Kell, These Are the 10 Biggest Retail Bankruptcies of the Last 
Decade, FORTUNE (Mar. 2, 2016, 10:02 AM), http://fortune.com/2016/03/02/biggest-retail-
bankruptcies. 
 125. Puchniak, supra note 40, at 13. 
 126. Id.   
 127. Puchniak, supra note 40, at 11. 
 128. The Banking Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-89, 48 Stat. 162 (1933). 
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to the Nissan-Renault-Mitsubishi alliance, nearly twenty years after the 
establishment of the original Nissan-Renault alliance.  With the inclusion of 
MMC into the alliance in 2018, the group became the largest manufacturer 
and seller of cars and light vehicles in the world, edging out Volkswagen.  
Furthermore, by streamlining, the alliance claimed to have produced annual 
savings of $6.2 billion in total.129  
Similar to Keiretsu style groups, the individual car companies held 
cross-holdings of each other.  Renault owned 43% of Nissan, while Nissan 
owned 34% of MMC and held a 15% non-voting stake in Renault (the French 
government also owned 15% of Renault).  In a basic sense, the alliance had 
some of the characteristics of a Keiretsu.  However, Renault’s ignorance of 
the informal social ties that held the executives of Mitsubishi together would 
end up putting the Nissan-Renault-Mitsubishi alliance in trouble.   
Despite the ownership structure, internal relations between the firms 
proved to be too toxic.  Several years into the Nissan-Renault alliance, it 
became clear that Nissan was the more successful brand.  However, the 
slanted corporate structure between the two companies (43% stake v. 15% 
non-voting stake), led to negative sentiment from Nissan.  This sentiment 
was magnified in 2015 when the French government, under the direction of 
then-finance minister, Emmanuel Macron, increased the French 
government’s stake to 20% and passed a law giving the state increased voting 
rights.130  Fear of Paris controlling Nissan fueled the fears of both Nissan and 
the Japanese government.131   
Within the company, Nissan employees were also discouraged by the 
ownership structure.  Japanese employees felt discriminated against, 
claiming they were receiving promotions at a slower rate than the non-
Japanese employees.132  Unfortunately, the alliance did not nurture the 
informal social ties that typically accompany a Japanese style Keiretsu—a 
system Nissan was ultimately accustomed to. 
The alliance was abruptly put into chaos in November 2018 when the 
Japanese police—in an uncharacteristically bold move—arrested Carlos 
Ghosn, the former Chairman of Nissan, Chairman of Renault, and the main 
 
 129. Renault-Nissan-Mitsubishi has become the world’s biggest carmaker, supra note 
104. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id.   
 132. Mark Matousek, Nissan employees reportedly burst into applause when they learned 
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glue holding the entire alliance together.133  It is believed that disgruntled 
whistle-blowers within Nissan made the disclosures leading to Ghosn’s 
arrest.134  Following the arrest, Mitsubishi and Nissan quickly expelled 
Ghosn from their management hierarchy.  Renault’s ignorance of informal 
ties and the lack of solidarity seen in a typical Keiretsu is likely an underlying 
cause of the tension that had been building up.  The rift was clearly reflected 
when Nissan employees were reported to have burst into applause after 
learning of Ghosn’s arrest.135 
 
IV. Conclusion and Final Words 
 
Overall, the Japanese economic structure is still influenced by an old 
system of informal relationships.  Furthermore, while the ability of banks to 
own equity ownership in other corporations seems to be the most significant 
legal difference between the U.S. and Japanese financial system, the 
informal ties built from cross-holdings are what set the two economies apart. 
However, informal agreements and social contracts between the private 
banking sector and the government regulatory agencies—once an implicit 
standard—has come under stress.  Continuously low interest rates have put 
large private banks in an insecure spot, unable to operate the way they always 
have, and being forced to change.  Furthermore, the government’s historic 
policy of support towards the banks is starting to falter.  In doing so, private 
banks may soon no longer have the strength to bail out weak industries—as 
they have in the past—or Japan may have to begin depending more on formal 
safety nets such as deposit insurance. 
On the other hand, allowing banks to hold equity stakes in Keiretsu 
member corporations have changed the creditor-shareholder relationship.  
While the U.S. system separates the two—giving each side different 
priorities during financial distress—Japan’s system marries the two interests 
into one.  By merging those interests, banks have a more significant 
monitoring role, but also puts itself at risk by pooling its capital to rescue the 
occasional non-performing companies.Most interesting, the informal ties 
between the government, banking institutions, and Keiretsu groups are 
astounding in strength, importance, and breadth of influence.  Previously, the 
government’s accommodating policy towards banking institutions—in 
return for the banks’ duty to monitor and rescue—and the ability of the 
 
 133. Marlene Awaad, Nissan’s ex-chairman Ghosn re-arrested, chances of imminent bail 
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Keiretsu banks to pool the collective strength of an entire group shows an 
astounding level of solidarity and organizational strength.  
However, as seen in the Mitsubishi cases, the strength to support weak 
businesses, and the inability to adapt can lead to financial/investment 
decisions considered unprofitable or irrational.  However, despite the 
criticisms of the loyalty systems in Japan, they remain integral for success in 
the Japanese business environment. As seen in the Nissan-Renault-
Mitsubishi alliance, a lack of internal solidarity and relationship ties can 
inversely put an alliance under immense stress.   
While the majority of the post-WWII financial regulatory environment 
and the Keiretsu system has brought a certain level of stability and 
survivability to the business enterprises in Japan, it remains to be seen if this 
system will remain intact following the economic woes of the financial crisis 
that started in 2008 which still affects Japan today.  As low or negative 
interest rates and a division of policy complicate the relationship between 
government regulators and private banking institutions, it threatens to upend 
the long-established system.  As the government reduces its support of large 
banking institutions, we may begin to see the end of massive Keiretsu 
bailouts similar to that seen in Mitsubishi’s rescue of MMC.  However, 
against all the odds—breakups by the U.S. military, economic bubble bursts, 
banking crises, scandals and the financial crisis of 2008—Keiretsu groups 
have remained resilient, begging the question, is this time really different?  
Perhaps it is time to stop expecting Japan’s corporate culture to change and 
learn instead to work with it. 
 
